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Theo A. F. Kuipers 
THE NON-STANDARD APPROACH TO CONFIRMATION
AND THE RAVENS PARADOXES 
REPLY TO PATRICK MAHER 
Patrick Maher’s (PM, for short) critical paper requires a long reply. His first 
main point is my non-standard approach to confirmation. The second deals 
with my notion of conditional deductive confirmation and its application to the 
ravens paradoxes. In the first part of this reply I defend the non-standard 
approach extensively in a non-dogmatic way. In the second part I defend the 
notion of conditional deductive confirmation and its application to both 
counterintuitive cases dealing with ravens, or rather with black and non-black 
non-ravens. I am happy to be able to conclude this reply with a survey of the 
main interesting observations that I learned from Maher’s critical exposition. 
The Non-Standard Approach, i.e. the Success Definition of Confirmation 
On Section 1: Definition of Confirmation 
In Section 1, Maher criticizes my success definition of confirmation in a way 
that demands either retreat or extensive defense. For the moment I opt for the 
latter. In the introduction to Part I of ICR (p. 15) I announce the three main 
non-standard aspects of the success definition: its “reversive” (although I did 
not use that term), its “inclusive” and its “pure” character. That is, it reverses
the definiens clause from ‘E makes H more plausible’ into ‘H makes E more 
plausible’, it is pure in the sense that it is neutral in rewarding hypotheses of 
different plausibility for the same success, and it includes the possibility of 
confirming “p-zero” hypotheses (i.e. hypotheses with probability zero). I shall 
deal with these aspects in the reverse order. Whenever the distinction is not 
relevant, I move freely between qualitative and quantitative, i.e. probabilistic, 
formulations.
Theo A. F. Kuipers 110
Let us start, though, with a relativization by quoting a passage from the 
introduction to the quantitative chapter in ICR (p. 44): 
Moreover, as in the qualitative case, it will also become clear that there is not one 
“language of quantitative confirmation”, but several, e.g., pure and impure ones, inclusive 
and non-inclusive ones. As long as one uses the probability calculus, it does not matter 
which confirmation language one chooses, the only important point is to always make 
clear which one one has chosen. Although speaking of confirmation languages is hence 
more appropriate, we will accept the current practice of speaking of confirmation 
theories.
Unfortunately I did not elaborate the ‘as in the qualitative case’ in the 
qualitative chapter itself. But implicitly it is fairly clear in that chapter that I 
am well aware that there are also different “languages of qualitative
confirmation,” and hence that, if one assumes the obvious qualitative 
plausibility “calculus,” viz. the one implied by the (quantitative) probability 
calculus, “the only important point is to always make clear which one one has 
chosen.” Hence, my defense of the non-standard approach must be seen 
against this non-dogmatic background. At the end of the following defense I 
even propose a kind of fusion between my non-standard approach and the pure 
version of the standard approach. 
1. Zero probabilities. Maher is right in demanding attention for the fact that a 
main disadvantage of my approach seems to be that confirmation by “p-zero” 
evidence (i.e. evidence with probability zero) is indeed impossible. I should 
have paid explicit attention to this possible objection.
1.1. Verifying p-zero evidence. Let us therefore start with Maher’s prima facie
very convincing example of a specific real value as evidence fitting into an 
interval hypothesis. Maher is right in speaking about verification in this case, 
but he also wants to see verification, in line with the standard approach, as an 
extreme, but proper, case of confirmation, which is indeed impossible from my 
perspective. Inherent in my approach, and hopefully radiating from my 
(qualitative/deductive) Confirmation Matrix (ICR, p. 22) and the 
(quantitative/probabilistic) Confirmation Square (ICR, p. 46), is that 
verification is at most an improper extreme kind of confirmation (see ICR, 
pp. 46-7). Hence I would indeed like to “deny that in this case there is any 
[proper] confirmation at all” (PM, p. 4). Instead, it is a straightforward case of 
verification, not at all made problematic by being due to p-zero evidence. In 
such a case of verification, E (logically) entails H, and there is nothing more to 
say about it. For example, whereas in the case of (proper) confirmation it is 
plausible to distinguish between deductive and non-deductive (i.e. 
probabilistic) confirmation, a similar distinction is not relevant for verification, 
nor for falsification for that matter; formally speaking, verification and 
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falsification are unproblematic qualifications. In other words, it is not 
verification but deductive confirmation that is an extreme proper case of 
confirmation; verification and deductive confirmation only go together when H
and E are logically equivalent.
Historians are well aware of the fundamental distinction between 
verification and confirmation. In many cases they can just verify their 
hypotheses of interest. Consider hypotheses about the date and place of birth 
and death that may have been suggested by some previous evidence. Such 
hypotheses may subsequently just be verified (or falsified) by consulting the 
relevant civil records. Of course, such data may occasionally be doubted, but 
that holds for all types of evidence and will have to be accounted for by the 
appropriate type of “Jeffrey-conditionalization” or by “globalization,” see 
below. Moreover, if verification is impossible, e.g. a town’s civic records 
might have been lost, historians will of course search for merely confirming 
evidence. Occasionally this may lead to deductively confirming, but non-
verifying, evidence. For example, a more global civic register may survive in 
the archives of the province or region, containing only the years of birth and 
death, but not the precise days, let alone the hours. The fact that in the 
suggested historical cases the evidence may have been assigned some non-zero 
probability is, of course, not relevant for our arguing for a fundamental 
distinction between (proper) confirmation and verification 
1.2. Non-verifying p-zero evidence. As I describe myself (ICR, p. 45) in an 
example, there are cases of non-verifying p-zero evidence that leave room for 
defining a meaningful posterior probability p(H/E), despite the fact that the 
standard definition is not applicable since p(E) = 0. The consequence is, as I 
should have remarked, that this makes confirmation possible in the standard 
sense but not in my sense, which is technically similar to the way in which my 
definition leaves room for confirmation of p-zero hypotheses and the standard 
one does not. However, there is a fundamental difference between the 
relevance of the counterexamples. When p(E) = 0 because E reports a 
particular real number out of a real interval, it is very likely that one should 
take measure errors into account or that the relevant parameter, e.g. length, just 
cannot be said to have such a unique value. For both reasons it is then 
plausible to rephrase the evidence in terms of a small interval of values, which 
might be called “globalization” of the evidence, in which case, of course, we 
get p-non-zero evidence and hence the problem disappears. To be sure, there 
are cases where this globalization is also possible when dealing with p-zero
hypotheses. Take, for example, the hypothesis that a certain die is unbiased. In 
view of the fact that totally unbiased dice will not exist in the real world, we 
should assign that hypothesis zero probability. Of course, globalization to a 6-
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tuple of very small intervals will make a non-zero assignment plausible. Maher 
seems to suggest this strategy by the claim “the evidence confirms that the 
hypothesis is close to the truth” (PM, p. 3).  
However, in other at least as typical scientific cases this strategy does not 
make much sense. Consider Einstein’s (general) test implication of (at least a 
certain degree of) light bending when passing heavy objects. For a Newtonian 
who assigns probability one to Newton’s theory, this test implication might 
well receive probability zero. Hence, however unproblematic Eddington’s data 
might have been (which they were not, but that is another story), they would 
not confirm Einstein’s specific general test implication according to the 
standard approach. However, some kind of globalization of the hypothesis, 
whether or not in the “close to the truth” form, is here out of order. Although 
Einstein made a much more specific, quantitative prediction, the prediction 
mentioned is already of a qualitative very global nature, but it nevertheless 
captures the fundamental surprise and risk of his GTR. Hence, in contrast to 
the standard approach, according to my theory, a “half-open-minded” 
Newtonian can see the experimental results as confirming evidence for 
Einstein’s theory. If so, he may well see this as a good reason for a non-
Bayesian move, viz. changing his prior distribution such that Einstein’s theory 
receives a positive probability, however small. 
1.3. The counterfactual strategy. Some version of this move is also suggested 
by Maher when he states that one may say when a scientist talks about 
confirmation of a p-zero hypothesis from the standard point of view “that what 
the scientist said is not strictly true, although it is understandable why someone 
might say that” (PM, p. 3). Of course, this response is also available for his 
discussion of confirmation by p-zero evidence. More specifically, in both cases 
one might interpret his way of talking as some kind of counterfactual personal 
claim: “if I would have assigned non-zero probability, to the hypothesis 
respectively the evidence, then the evidence would confirm the hypothesis.”
2. The second comparative principle. The second main reason for the success 
definition applies already to the “normal case” of non-zero probabilities for 
hypotheses and evidence. Maher does not pay attention to my emphasis on 
comparative principles. In this context, particularly P.2 (ICR, p. 24) and its 
generalization P.2G (ICR, p. 64) are important. Although P.2G does not entail 
the non-standard approach, I argue that it provides very good additional 
reasons for preferring the non-standard approach. Starting from the non-
standard definition (SDC, ICR, p. 23): 
(a)  E confirms H iff (E is a success of H in the sense that) H makes E
 more plausible  
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it is plausible to also have (see ICR, P.2G, p. 64, the core of which is):   
(Ca) E confirms H more than H* iff H makes E more plausible than H*
  does  
  E equally confirms H and H* iff H and H* make E equally  plausible 
The additional definitions for probabilistic versions of both subclauses are 
obvious: p(E/H) > p(E/H*) and p(E/H) = p(E/H*) respectively. 
The standard definition: 
(b) E confirms H iff E makes H more plausible 
suggests in contrast the “double” conditions: 
(Cb) E confirms H more than H* iff E makes H “more more plausible”
  than H*
E equally confirms H and H* iff E makes H “equally more 
plausible” than H*
which are not so easy to elaborate. In particular, for the probabilistic versions 
everything depends on whether one chooses the ratio or the difference measure 
as the degree of confirmation (or a close relative of one of them). Or, more 
cautiously, for judging “more more plausible” or “equally more plausible” one 
has to choose between comparing differences of the form p(H/E)  p(H) or 
ratios of the form p(H/E)/p(H). If one opts for comparing differences one’s 
comparative judgments come very much to depend on the prior probabilities of 
the hypotheses, my reason for writing in ICR of the impure nature of that 
approach to confirmation.
At least some philosophers of science seem to subscribe to (Ca), which 
only leaves room for the ratio measure (or a close relative). For instance, 
Elliott Sober (2000, p. 5) states the principle (in my symbols): 
H is better supported than H* by E iff p(E/H) > p(E/H*)
See also (Sober, 2001, pp. 30-3), where he calls a strong version of it “E
strongly favors H over H* iff p(E/H) >> p(E/H*)” the Likelihood Principle. 
To be sure, Sober does not want to talk about ‘confirmation’ here: “We may 
ask whether an observation supports one hypothesis better than another. Here 
we’re not interested in whether the one hypothesis has a higher prior 
probability than the other; we want to isolate what the impact of the 
observation is” (Sober 2000, p. 5).  Although many attempts have been made 
in the literature to draw such a distinction between confirmation and 
(evidential) support, I would like to argue that we might well read his principle 
in terms of confirmation. The reason is that I simply do not believe that 
scientists would not subscribe to the following general claim: 
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E better supports H than H* iff E confirms H more than H*
And I would claim, in addition, they have good reasons for that, for the only 
things that really count for the practical purposes of scientists are the 
unconditional and conditional plausibility or probability of evidence or, for 
that matter, of hypotheses, and their comparisons. Regarding “diachronic” 
comparisons, including comparisons of diachronic comparisons, it is rather 
unclear what other aim we can meaningfully have than “to isolate what the 
impact of the observation is,” that is, the pure perspective. Any other 
comparison will lead to a mixture of unconditional, conditional and 
“transitional” aspects, which can be decomposed into purely unconditional, 
conditional and transitional aspects. 
To support this claim I consider cases of deductive and/or non-deductive 
confirmation of two hypotheses by the same evidence. The upshot will be that 
many intuitions not only suggest that the impure perspective is problematic, 
but also that a choice between pure and impure degrees of confirmation does 
not have to be made, and this only follows from the non-standard definition. 
2.1. Comparing deductive confirmation. If both H and H* entail E, they are 
equally confirmed according to (Ca), but according to (Cb) we have first to 
decide whether we want to compare ratios or differences. If we take ratios the 
same verdict results, but if we take differences we obtain that the resulting 
verdict totally depends on the relative initial plausibility of the hypothesis: the 
more plausible the more confirmed. It seems rather strange that for such 
essentially qualitative judgements one first has to make a choice between 
quantitative criteria. For example, both Newton and Einstein deductively 
predict the falling of stones near the surface of the moon. Would somebody 
who is told about confirming experiments by Neil Armstrong have first to 
make up his mind about whether he prefers comparing ratios or differences in 
order to judge whether one of the theories is more confirmed than the other or 
whether they are equally confirmed? If he were not to do so, he would consider 
this choice as irrelevant. But that would mean that he can’t subscribe to (Cb), 
for that requires a choice. On the other hand, if he wanted to make up his mind, 
he would be likely to subscribe to (Cb). If he then came to the conclusion that 
he would favor comparing differences rather than ratios he would in addition 
have to make up his mind about which hypothesis he finds the more plausible. 
On the other hand, if he prefers ratios he comes to the “equal confirmation”  
conclusion only by a rather technical detour. In sum, (Cb) forces one to 
consider technicalities of a kind that scientists, usually not very sympathetic to 
the concerns of philosophers of science, are not inclined to do. On the 
contrary, scientists are likely to have strong intuitions in the suggested case. In 
which direction, would essentially have to be tested by psychologists of 
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science, where the third possibility  more confirmation of the less plausible 
hypothesis  should also be taken into consideration.
2.2. Comparing deductive and non-deductive confirmation. Let us quote a long 
passage from Adam Morton’s Theory of Knowledge (second edition, 1997, 
p.186), with abbreviations between []-brackets added: 
Evidence supports beliefs that make it more probable.  Suppose a geologist defends a 
theory [H1] which predicts [P1] an earthquake somewhere on the Pacific coast of North 
America sometime in the next two years. Then if an earthquake occurs at a particular 
place and time [E1], the theory is somewhat supported. Suppose, on the other hand, that 
another geologist defends a theory [H2] which predicts [P2] an earthquake of force 5 on 
the Richter scale with its epicentre on the UCLA campus on 14 September (the 
anniversary of Carnap’s death, incidentally) in the year 2,000. If this were to occur [E2],
it would be very strong evidence for the theory. 
In the following formalization I equate E1 with E2 = P2, neglecting the 
particular force, and indicate it just by E, because the force is not essential and 
E1 could have been any earthquake verifying P1. In this way we get: 
H1 deductively predicts P1  hence, 1= p(P1/H1)
H2 deductively predicts P2 = E  hence, 1= p(E/H2) = p(P2/H2)
E logically entails P1 and is
even much stronger    hence, p(P1) > p(E),  p(P1/H1) > p(E/H1)
E obtains
Morton, who, like Sober, also avoids talking about confirmation, concludes 
that E is very strong evidence for H2 and somewhat supports H1, but I do not 
hesitate to claim that scientists would see no problem in also saying: 
H2 is more confirmed by E than H1
From (our formalization of) Morton’s description it follows straightforwardly 
that p(E/H2) = 1 > p(E/H1) and hence the case may well be seen as supporting 
(Ca).
But assume the (Cb)-perspective for a while. Of course, according to the 
ratio comparison we get the same verdict, for the denominator does not play a 
role: p(E/H2)/p(E) = 1/p(E) > p(E/H1)/p(E). According to the difference 
measure this result obtains iff
p(H2) (p(E/H2)/p(E)  1) > p(H1) (p(E/H1)/p(E)  1) 
and hence iff 
p(H2) (1/p(E)  1) > p(H1) (p(E/H1)/p(E)  1) 
which holds of course only under specific conditions. Let us assume that 
p(H1) = np(H2)<1 and p(E/H1) = mp(E)<1 then we get: iff 
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P(E) > 1/(1+n(m1)). Although we may of course assume that m and n are 
both fairly large, such that the condition does impose a rather small lower 
bound for p(E), it is nevertheless perfectly possible that p(E) is smaller, in 
which case the opposite of Morton’s intuition is satisfied: E confirms H1 more 
than H2. Suppose, for example, that m = 11 and n = 100, the lower bound is 
1/1001, i.e. 1 promille. Hence, the opposite situation certainly is a realistic 
possibility. In that case we would have a case where, at least according to 
Morton, “E is very strong evidence for H2 and somewhat supports H1,” but 
philosophers of science in favor of the difference measure would nevertheless 
want to say that “E confirms H1 more than H2.”
2.3 Comparing non-deductive confirmation. Let us now turn to the second 
example suggested by Morton (p. 186): 
Or consider the hypotheses that a coin is fair [H1] and that it is biased [H2]. Suppose that 
the coin is tossed and [E] lands heads fourteen times and tails one time. This evidence is 
consistent with both hypotheses, but it has very low probability on the hypothesis that the 
coin is fair and much higher probability on the hypothesis that the coin is biased. So it 
gives much stronger evidence for the hypothesis that the coin is biased. 
We may formalize the second example by: 
0 < p(E/H1) << p(E/H2) < 1 and E obtains 
According to Morton, E gives much stronger evidence for H2 than for H1.
Again, I would not hesitate to claim that scientists would easily say, in 
agreement with (Ca) and, only, with the ratio version of (Cb): 
E confirms H2 much more than H1
According to the difference comparison we get this iff 
p(H2) (p(E/H2)/p(E)  1) > p(H1) (p(E/H1)/p(E)  1) 
with perfect possibilities for an opposite verdict. Again we would have a case 
in which, at least according to Morton, E “gives much strong evidence for” H2
than H1, but philosophers of science favoring differences would nevertheless 
want to say that “E confirms H1 more than H2.”
In sum, my impression is that scientists easily subscribe to (Ca). If they do 
that indirectly via (Cb) they need to be aware of a particular choice as degree 
of confirmation. However, since scientists usually do not express their 
attitudes in terms of degrees of confirmation (or support), it is more plausible 
that they directly subscribe to (Ca). Of course, this is my informal prejudice 
about the reasoning of scientists, which only a systematic research by 
interviews or questionnaires could decide. What “most works on confirmation 
theory” say (PM, p. 2), is not decisive because the view of confirmation 
theorists may well be loaded by their favorite interpretation of what they think 
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about the way scientists reason. Of course, it is likely that I am myself a victim 
of this, but only meta-empirical research can decide on this. For some further 
elaboration of this point, see below.  
3. The reverse defeniens clause. Maher claims that “According to etymology, 
dictionaries, and most works on confirmation theory, ‘E confirms H’ means 
that E makes H more plausible.” (PM, p. 2) Although I certainly agree that this 
“forward connotation” belongs to “confirmation” (vide my “reward 
principle”), I am not so sure that the “backward connotation” is not at least as 
important. My book presentation suggests that “forward confirmation” 
presupposes a success, that is, a success of a hypothesis is a necessary 
condition for confirmation of a hypothesis (by that same success). The 
question is whether it is a sufficient condition, of course, not according to 
“etymology, dictionaries, and most works on confirmation theory,” where the 
latter may be supposed to be written by philosophers (of science), but 
according to scientists. If so, the backward definition should be considered 
more basic. Maybe I should have presented my success definition not by 
(SDC, ICR, p. 23): 
 (a)  E confirms H iff (E is a success of H in the sense that) H makes E
  more plausible 
as quoted by Maher, but in two steps, viz. 
(a1) E confirms H iff E is a success of H
(a2) E is a success of H iff H makes E more plausible 
which yields: 
(a) E confirms H iff H makes E more plausible 
We should compare this with the “standard” interpretation: 
(b)   E confirms H iff E makes H more plausible 
which does not seem to be decomposable.
Neglecting extreme cases, I have the strong feeling that scientists will, 
when asked, agree with all four “absolute” claims as conceptually true 
statements. Above I argued that they are likely to also agree with the following 
comparative claims:
(Ca)   E confirms H more than H* iff H makes E more plausible than H*
does
     
  E equally confirms H and H* iff H and H* make E equally
  plausible 
rather than with 
(Cb) E confirms H more than H* iff E makes H “more more plausible”
  than H*
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  E equally confirms H and H* iff E makes H “equally more
  plausible” than H*
The reason is that if they subscribe primarily to (Cb) they not only have to 
assign some plausibilities or probabilities for any specific application, but they 
also in general have to decide about which degree of confirmation they prefer. 
This suggests that it is more likely that they combine (Ca) with the four 
absolute statements. Apart from the extreme cases, this can be perfectly 
realized by the ratio measure. To be precise, p(E/H)/p(E) can deal with all five 
claims (that is, a1, a2 (hence a), b, Ca, and Cb), except when p(E) = 0. As I 
suggested in ICR (pp.50-1), for that case it is plausible to use the form 
p(H/E)/p(H), which is for normal p-values equivalent to p(E/H)/p(E) and 
which may be defined in this case, assuming that p(H) > 0. E.g. in the 
(improper) extreme case of verification, it becomes 1/p(H).
Taking my non-dogmatic attitude seriously, the result is that I could live 
perfectly happily with the following asymmetric fusion of intuitions: 
(ab) E confirms H iff
  if E has some initial plausibility: H makes E more plausible 
  if E has none: E makes H more plausible 
  E is neutral for H iff
if E has some initial plausibility: H makes E neither more nor less 
plausible
  if E has none: E makes H more nor less plausible 
(Cab) E confirms H more than H* iff
  if E has some initial plausibility: H makes E more plausible than
  H* does
if E has none: E makes H more more plausible than H* in the ratio 
sense
  E equally confirms H and H* iff 
  if E has some initial plausibility: H and H* make E equally
  plausible   
  if E has none: E makes H and H* equally plausible in the ratio
  sense 
This completes my response to Maher’s Section 1. 
Conditional Deductive Confirmation and the Ravens Paradoxes 
The rest of Maher’s paper deals with my notion of cd-confirmation (Section 2) 
and its application to the ravens paradoxes (Sections 3-5). Although he comes 
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up with a number of interesting formal observations, I reject most of his 
general critique in the following. 
On Section 2: Conditional Deductive Confirmation8
In correspondence with Maher I have concluded that it is very important to 
stress that I see conditional deductive confirmation (cd-confirmation) as a kind 
of confirmation, but not as a kind of unconditional confirmation. More 
generally, the following distinctions in Ch. 2 and 3 of ICR are very important:
     deductive (d-confirmation) 
unconditional
     non-deductive  
confirmation
     deductive (cd-confirmation) 
conditional
     non-deductive 
Before I go into a specific criticism of cd-confirmation, it may be helpful to 
refer to a sentence of Maher in the concluding Section 6 (PM, p. 14). He 
writes: “C-confirmation [i.e., cd-confirmation with C as condition, TK] is just 
d-confirmation with C added to the background beliefs … and so adds nothing 
essentially new.” I would not at all object to this claim. My only point is that in 
the context of cd-confirmation it is very practical to draw a distinction between 
fixed background beliefs and variable initial conditions as they occur as 
experimental conditions, such as, look for a raven (and then check its color) or 
look for a non-black object (and then check its (natural) kind). Note that in my 
formal presentations in ICR, I omitted, for simplicity, all references to fixed 
background beliefs, with explicitly saying so. 
Let us now return to Section 2. Maher rightly suggests that I give two 
related but different definitions of cd-confirmation. However, from my 
presentation it is also clear that their relation is of a type-token or generic-
specific kind. I start with (the general structure of) a token of cd-confirmation 
and then generalize it to a type. The token is of course basic, and there may be 
problems with the generalization. Maher summarizes both definitions in the 
second paragraph of Section 2 (with a correct simplification explained in Note 
3). I repeat the generic definition of cd-confirmation:
                                                          
8 Maher is right (PM, p. 5) regarding the desirable exclusion of “maximally plausible evidence” in 
the definition of deductive confirmation. When summarizing Ch. 2-4 of ICR for SiS (pp. 207-8), I 
discovered the omission that I had not made explicit that E is supposed to be contingent (and H
consistent, in both cases relative to the fixed background beliefs), hence not maximally plausible. 
Note that my generic definition of cd-confirmation implies that E is non-tautological, by requiring 
that C is so, and E has to imply C according to that definition. 
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E cd-confirms H iff there exists a C such that E entails C and E C-confirms H
Maher successfully shows by THEOREM 1 that this generic definition is (still) 
defective in the sense that almost every E cd-confirms H. More precisely, he 
shows that when LI(E, H) (i.e., E and H are logically independent) and when 
there is some D LI(D, E & H), then Cmaher = Cm = Ev(H&D) is such 
that E Cm-confirms H. For all conditions for specific cd-confirmation are now 
satisfied:
(i) LI(H, Cm)
(ii) Cm does not entail E
(iii) H&Cm entails E
Of course, to prevent this trivialization one may either try to define specific cd-
confirmation more restrictively or the generic type. In view of the very 
artificial nature of Cm it is plausible to first think of adapting the generic 
definition in order to exclude this Cm just because of its artificiality.
The condition Cm = Ev(H & D) is in several respects not very like an 
initial condition as it occurs in standard examples of explanation of individual 
events or in my favorite examples of conditional confirmation, e.g. Cr: raven 
(x); Er: raven (x) and black (x). First, whatever E, H and D are, Cm can’t be of 
a conjunctive nature, that is, an atomic formula or its negation or a conjunction 
of such formulas. Second, although Cm  is logically independent of H in the 
straightforward sense, it needs H for its definition. Third, Cm needs D for its 
definition, although D is logically independent of E & H. Of course, all 
three aspects can be used to exclude Cm. At the moment I would favor to 
requiring a conjunctive nature of C, but this may well be too restrictive and/or 
still leave room for other types of artificial conditions. However, Maher’s 
counterexample does not at all show that it is impossible to prevent 
trivialization of generic cd-confirmation due to artificially construed 
conditions. On the contrary, it stimulates the search for an improvement of the 
generic definition. 
On Section 3: The Ravens Paradox9
Regarding the object versus propositional form, it is evident that, for example, 
by giving an example of Nicod’s criterion, i.e. Maher’s PRINCIPLE 1, in 
object form, viz. ‘a black raven confirms RH’, where RH is short for ‘all 
ravens are black’, the propositional form is the intended formal version of the 
more easy, but somewhat ambiguous, object form. Indeed, Hempel also 
                                                          
9 Unfortunately I speak about “raven paradoxes’ and not of “ravens paradoxes”. The mistake is due 
to the fact that in Dutch ‘raven’ is already the plural form (of ‘raaf’). 
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frequently uses the object form, but jumps to the other wherever relevant, and 
so do I.
More importantly, from my very brief indications in ICR (p. 27) it is clear 
that I do not claim a new argument for the paradoxes. Hence, as far as the 
second paradox is concerned, I just intended to refer to Hempel’s argument. 
Maher is certainly right in arguing that there is a gap between deriving (J) and 
the claimed derivability of (E) from Nicod’s condition and the equivalence 
condition. To argue, starting from (J), that “any object which is either no raven 
or also black” confirms RH, in particular, a black non-raven, presupposes what 
might be called the “converse consequence property with respect to the 
evidence.” This property is indeed problematic and, hence, not defended in 
ICR. In sum, Maher is right in claiming that Hempel’s argument for deriving 
the second paradox is problematic.
 Although I should have paid attention to this problem, my ultimate target 
would have been the same, namely to argue that, in the context of (conditional) 
deductive confirmation, a proper explication should not allow the confirmation 
of RH by (the proposition describing) a black non-raven. However, Maher also 
argues that this confirmation claim is not so counterintuitive as the one dealing 
with a non-black non-raven, i.e. the first paradox, whereas I suggest the 
opposite comparative intuition. Maher is certainly right in suggesting that there 
are contexts in which a black non-raven confirms RH. In my quantitative 
explication I concede this ((1p), ICR, p. 59) when one is random sampling in 
the universe of objects, leading to the same degree of confirmation for all three 
cases. More generally, sampling, randomly or not so randomly, I would 
subscribe to both questioned confirmation claims as long as the sampling is not 
among non-ravens or black objects, that is, the context for (conditional) 
deductive confirmation. Unfortunately, Maher’s formulations ‘find[ing] a non-
raven to be black’ and ‘finding a non-raven to be non-black’ are in this respect 
rather unclear. In particular, I hesitate to subscribe to the reverse plausibility 
claim, but I do not exclude types of non-random sampling in which I would 
agree with this verdict. 
On Section 4: Kuipers’ Solution 
In this section Maher addresses three points with respect to my solution of the 
first paradox of the ravens hypothesis RH (all ravens are black), which 
amounts to
(4)  a black raven cd-confirms RH more than a non-black non-raven 
or to use Maher’s preferred formulation 
(4) Ra & Ba cd-confirms RH more than Ra & Ba does 
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Moreover, the assumption is that the background beliefs (of course, the 
relevant ones, that is, our background beliefs) include or imply that the number 
of ravens #R is (much) smaller than the number of non-black objects #B.
Let us start with Subsection 4.3, where he claims that I should have written 
instead of (4):
(4c) Ra & Ba Ra-confirms RH more than Ra & Ba Ba-confirms RH
However, it is very clear from the context of (4) that this is precisely what I 
mean more specifically. Let me just quote claim (2), starting just nine lines 
above (4), and even on the same page, viz. ICR, p. 28. 
(2)  a black raven and a non-black non-raven both cd-confirm RH, more
 specifically, a black raven on the condition of being a raven and a non- 
 black non-raven on the condition of being non-black. 
Hence I agree that, strictly speaking, (4c) is my solution of the first paradox.
 In Subsection 4.1 Maher points out, by THEOREM 2 (PM, pp.10-11), that 
the suggested quantitative rationale of the presupposed underlying qualitative
conditional principle P.1c, unlike the unconditional version, is sensitive to the 
degree of confirmation chosen. That is, the ratio measure entails (in Maher’s 
notation):
P.1cq:  if E C-confirms H and E* C*-confirms H then
  c(H, E/C) > c(H, E*/C*) iff p(E*/C*) > p(E/C)
but the difference measure does not.10 This is an interesting finding. But I am 
of course inclined to see it as an additional argument in favor of the choice for 
the ratio measure. Whereas the unconditional and the conditional quantitative 
version of P.2 are both in favor of the ratio measure, the unconditional 
quantitative version of P.1 is still satisfied by both measures. However, as soon 
as we consider the conditional quantitative version, i.e. P.1cq, only the ratio 
measure satisfies. Instead of seeing it as a case of circular reasoning, as Maher 
suggests, I see this conclusion more as a case of the so-called “wide reflective 
equilibrium” between qualitative and quantitative (and simplicity) 
considerations (cf. Thagard, 1988, adapting the ethical method developed by 
Rawls and Daniels). Sure, this does not provide a “rationally compelling 
justification” for P.1c, that is, 
P.1c: if E C-confirms H and E* C*-confirms H then
  E C-confirms H more than E* C*-confirms H iff
                                                          
10 Nor the likelihood ratio measure, which I neglect further, but the same points can be made for 
that measure. It may be true that Fitelson (2001) gives new arguments in favor of this measure, but 
in Kuipers (forthcoming, Section 1.2.1) I explain why his arguments in (Fitelson 1999) do not 
convince me.
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  E* is, given C*, more plausible than E, given C,
  in the light of the background beliefs 
but I am happy with good reason. That is, the main question is, how plausible 
are P.1c and P.1cq? If they do not hold, there may be cases that a C-
experiment is more risky for H than a C*-experiment but the less surprising 
evidence E* would nevertheless confirm H more than the more surprising E.
Put in terms of ravens: although investigating ravens may be more risky than 
investigating non-black objects, RH could be more confirmed by hitting a 
(non-black) non-raven in the second case than by hitting a black raven in the 
first case. This sounds rather counterintuitive. 
In Subsection 4.2 Maher shows, by THEOREM 3, that the ‘only if’ claim 
of my specification of P.1c , i.e., S# 1.c, is not valid, using the ratio measure, 
for it turns out to leave room for a counterexample. However, I am not really 
impressed by the counterexample. It amounts to a case of “more cd-
confirmation by a black raven (assuming that it is a raven) than by a non-black 
non-raven (assuming that it is a non-black object)” even if the mentioned 
condition #R < #B is not satisfied in a straightforward sense. As Maher 
concludes himself, in the example “there is a probability 1/2 that #R > #B,”
but one should add that “there is also a probability 1/2 that #R < #B.” Now it 
is easy to check in the example that the expected value of the ratio (of sizes, 
not to be confused with the ratio degree of confirmation) #R/#B is 7/8. Since 
this is less than 1 it is a nice case of a sophisticated version of the background 
belief that #R < #B. That is, I would already be perfectly happy if all possible 
counterexamples nevertheless lead to a lower than 1 expectation for the ratio 
of the sizes. In other words, I would only be impressed, even very impressed, 
by an example in which this expected ratio is at least 1. In view of my earlier 
challenge to Maher to provide one, I conclude for the time being that he did 
not find one. 
Maher also discusses the if-side of my claim S# 1.c. With THEOREM 4 he 
points out that a sophisticated, probabilistic version of the if-claim obtains. 
However, I do not see what his objections are to my proof sketch on pp. 28-9 
of ICR. I simply point out in terms of percentages that, whatever the numbers 
of the three types of individuals are that do not falsify RH, for every non-zero 
number of non-black ravens, hitting a black raven among the ravens is less 
plausible than hitting among the non-black objects at a non-black non-raven, 
as soon as the number of ravens is less than the number of non-black objects. 
This amounts to (II-R) in combination with (I), (III)-(V). Certainly, this is (at 
most) a case of quasi-quantitative reasoning that can only be made precise in a 
strictly quantitative sense, but that this is possible is very much suggested by 
the presented argument. Although I do not want to dispute Maher’s 
THEOREM 5, which is based on the general condition (II), I have only 
Theo A. F. Kuipers 124
claimed to subscribe to (II-R), in which the starred properties of (II) are limited 
to the complementary properties of the unstarred ones. For this reason, in 
contrast to Maher, I find it much easier to call (II-R) a plausible principle than 
(II). Finally, Maher is right in claiming that my proof sketch is strictly 
speaking laden with the assumption that RH is false. His proof of THEOREM 
4 not only makes clear in detail that a quantitative refinement is indeed 
possible, but also that one only has to assume that RH is not certain. 
On Section 5: Adequacy of the Solution 
In the last substantial Section Maher mentions his criteria for an adequate 
solution of the (first) ravens paradox in terms of the three, inconsistent, 
principles mentioned in his Section 3: 
PRINCIPLE 1: Ra & Ba confirms (x) (Rx o Bx) (RH)
i.e. an instance of Nicod’s condition 
PRINCIPLE 2 is the equivalence condition and
PRINCIPLE 3: RA & BA does not confirm RH
According to Maher, an adequate solution requires (a) identifying the false 
principle(s), (b) insight into why they are false, and (c) identifying a true 
principle that is sufficiently similar to each false one “that failure to distinguish 
the two might explain why the false principle is prima facie plausible.”
These criteria sound very reasonable. Let me, therefore, instead of 
criticizing Maher’s evaluation of my solution in detail, summarize my solution 
in terms of these requirements in combination with my basic distinctions. For 
it follows from my presentation, whether one likes it or not, that it is important 
to distinguish between deductive and non-deductive confirmation, and for 
each, between unconditional and conditional confirmation. 
Starting with unconditional deductive confirmation, my diagnosis is that 
(a:) (only) the first principle is false, Nicod’s condition, that (b:) it is false 
because RH does not deductively entail the purported confirming instance 
Ra & Ba, and that (c:) “Ra & Ba Ra-confirms RH,” or equivalently, “Ra & Ba
cd-confirms RH on the condition Ra”, is sufficiently similar to “Ra & Ba
(d-)confirms RH” to explain “that failure to distinguish the two might explain 
why the false principle is prima facie plausible.” 
Turning to (specific) conditional deductive confirmation in general (a:) the 
third principle is false, because (b:)  RH & Ba entails Ra, and (c:) which 
should be distinguished from the claim that RH entails Ba & Ra.
  In terms of non-deductive, probabilistic confirmation, I claim (ICR, 
pp. 59-60), assuming random sampling in the (finite) universe of objects, 
regarding unconditional probabilistic confirmation (ICR, p. 59, (1p)) that  
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(a:) the third principle is false, that (b:) drawing any type of object compatible 
with RH is made more plausible/probable by RH, hence also a non-black non-
raven, or, if you prefer the standard formulation: the probability of RH, if 
initially positive, increases by such evidence; hence the degree of confirmation 
for RH provided by a non-black non-raven is higher than 1 according to the 
ratio measure (and positive according to the difference measure), and that (c:) 
the ratio will be very close to 1: whether we calculate it on the basis of an 
estimate of the number of non-black ravens (if RH is false) or in the 
sophisticated way indicated in Note 19 of ICR (p. 59, p. 337), as long as the 
expected number of non-black ravens is a small proportion of the number of 
objects in the world.
Regarding conditional probabilistic confirmation, see (2p)-(4p) (ICR, 
pp. 59-60), everything becomes a quantitative version of the corresponding 
conditional deductive situation. 
In sum, according to my analysis, in the unconditional deductive reading 
the first principle is false and the third true; in all other three readings the 
opposite is the case. In all four cases the verdict for each principle is explained. 
Finally, that the verdicts have to be reversed when going from the first reading 
to one of the other three explains very well why there has been a dispute and 
why it is so difficult to disentangle the purported paradox.  In general: the 
truth-value of Nicod’s condition depends on the precise version of the claim. 
Let me finally deal with Note 7, in which Maher criticizes my quantitative 
treatment of the (first) raven paradox, without going into details. He just 
claims that the fact that a black raven confirms RH (unconditionally) is 
fallacious because this “is not true in Good’s example.” Now, in Good’s 
example (Good, 1967), there are very specific and strong background 
knowledge beliefs. In particular, the number of black ravens is assumed to 
depend closely on whether or not RH is true: if RH is true there are 100 black 
ravens, and a million other birds; if RH is false, there are 1000 black ravens, 
one white, and again a million other birds. Of course, in that case a randomly 
drawn black raven should disconfirm RH, which it does according to all 
measures. But who wants to take this modeling as merely modeling random 
sampling in the universe of birds? One plausible way of modeling this, of 
course, is to assume that there is a fixed (finite, non-zero) number of black 
ravens and a fixed number of non-ravens, and some equally unknown finite but 
not necessarily non-zero number of non-black ravens, i.e., 0 or 1 or 2… My 
detailed unconditional claim (ICR, p. 59 and Note 19) is that when this 
modeling is adequate a black raven confirms RH (as well as a non-raven, black 
or non-black). For the moment I do not want to rule out that there are more 
defensible types of modeling random sampling among birds aiming at testing 
RH, but Good’s case is not one of them. To put it differently, nobody would 
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see his hypothetical background beliefs as a normal type of case of not 
knowing the truth-value of RH. Of course, and this is Good’s point, 
background beliefs around RH may be such that random sampling leads to the 
conclusion that a black raven disconfirms RH. On the other hand, the 
background beliefs around RH, other than those related to (relative) numbers, 
may be negligible, as I was apparently assuming, by not mentioning other 
kinds of fixed background beliefs. 
Conclusion
This completes my response to Maher’s Sections 2-5. In my comments on 
Section 2, I already referred in a positive sense to his diagnostic statement in 
his concluding Section 6 regarding the notion of conditional deductive 
confirmation. For the rest I have already pointed out that I do not agree with 
his conclusions. However, instead of repeating all disagreements, let me 
summarize the main interesting observations that I learned from Maher’s 
critical exposition. 
Section 1: taking my non-dogmatic attitude to confirmation seriously, I 
could live perfectly happily with an asymmetric fusion of non-standard and 
standard intuitions. 
Section  2: the generic definition of cd-confirmation needs improvement, in 
view of THEOREM 1, to prevent it from trivialization. 
Section 3: Hempel’s derivation of the second ravens paradox is prob-
lematic, hence the question is whether it really is a paradox. 
Section 4: THEOREM 2 shows that the difference measure for confir-
mation violates the plausible principle P.1c(q), providing an extra reason for 
the ratio measure. THEOREM 3 suggests a possible refinement of the 
formulation of the number condition in my solution of the first ravens paradox: 
the background beliefs need only to imply that the expected ratio of the 
number of ravens to the number of non-black objects is (much) smaller than 1. 
But this should be checked, for both directions. THEOREM 4 shows that a 
similar weakening of the underlying assumption of the qualitative solution, 
viz. that the ravens hypothesis is false, is possible: the hypothesis is not 
certain. 
Section 5: It is not yet generally realized that the truth-value of Nicod’s 
condition very much depends on the precise version of the claim. 
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